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abstract
This article explores responses by frontline workers in the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service 
(NAV) to activation policy measures. Frontline workers in NAV are required to write work capability 
assessments for long-term sick and disabled benefit recipients within a reformed organizational 
structure with holistic agencies (‘one-stop shops’). These policy mechanisms are intended to em-
power the frontline workers and make them emphasize work and activation in their evaluation 
of the employability of the beneficiaries. However, a large number of long-term sick and disabled 
people remain in receipt of temporary benefits. Key findings emerging from this study’s fieldwork 
suggest that frontline workers often perceive the task of clarifying the employability status of long-
term sick and disabled people to be demanding.  Their assessments hinge on criteria set by actors 
outside the frontline office—and these criteria are hard to obtain. Consequently, the limited range 
of exit options restricts the discretion of the frontline workers, which results in locking claimants with 
complex problems into temporary benefit.  Their attention tends to be drawn to concerns that are 
likely to be unintended, which are to keep claimants’ income safe and to secure a smooth workflow 
within the office as well as to smooth benefit transactions.  The context of a generous welfare state 
with a strongly rights-based benefit scheme is regarded as a likely contributor to these concerns.
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In Norway, nearly 14% of the working-age population receives incapacity benefits because of health impairments (Statistics Norway 2014). By comparison, the coun-try’s unemployment rate is 3% (Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service (NAV) 2015). 
Sick and disabled people thus constitute an important target group for activation pol-
icies, which seek to move more beneficiaries into the workforce by making benefits 
conditional upon participation in active measures such as work training. The Work 
Capability Assessment (WCA) was introduced in 2008 to support this aim. Further, the 
major public sector reform of 2006 (NAV reform) has reorganized the local agencies by 
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merging them into holistic ‘one-stop shops’ for enhancing activation and establishing 
‘back offices’ that should make decisions on benefit entitlement. The WCA and altered 
organizational structures would make frontline workers emphasize work and activation 
rather than sickness and health barriers in their evaluation of the employability of long-
term sick and disabled people.
Despite these efforts, recent research has suggested that a large number of long-term 
sick and disabled people remain in receipt of temporary benefits (Fevang et al. 2014; 
Kalstø and Sørbø 2014). Getting this group off benefits and into work is not a matter 
of traditional employment services, but rather about scrutinizing individuals’ residual 
working capacity as well as making efforts toward finding entries into the labor market. 
Thus, frontline workers are expected to make their claimants independent of the welfare 
system, but also make sure that people’s need and right to income security are complied 
with. It can therefore be argued that activation work presents frontline workers with 
new and challenging tasks.
This paper concentrates on the NAV staff as intermediating actors of activation 
policies and their clients. While activation policies are most often viewed as measures 
directed toward benefit recipients, these policies also target the frontline organization 
and its frontline staff (Brodkin and Marston 2013). Consequently, activation policies are 
about a ‘triple activation’ (van Berkel 2013). 
Previous studies concerning street-level bureaucracy in the era of activation policies 
have been concerned with the rise of New Public Management and governance reforms, 
and in particular how performance management, organizational targets, and standard-
ized working methods represent a threat to occupational standards and autonomy 
(Caswell et al. 2010; Garsten and Jacobsson 2013; Møller and Stone 2013; Soss et al. 
2011). Studies suggest that frontline workers tend to adapt to activation policies, and 
that this is often done in a ‘positive’ way in the sense that they develop their own inter-
pretations and reasoning according to the new activation norms (Møller and Stone 
2013; van der Aa and van Berkel 2015). Within the Norwegian context, the WCA and 
one-stop shops are presented by policymakers as a way of increasing staff autonomy 
(Gjersøe 2016; Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion 2006). For instance, the WCA 
is less standardized and more open to the discretion of street-level bureaucrats com-
pared with similar assessment instruments in other countries (Baumberg et al. 2015; 
Gjersøe 2016). 
It has been argued that governance reforms are not without consequences for the 
content of social services (Bredgaard and Larsen 2008). Frontline work constitutes an 
important policy arena (Brodkin and Marston 2013; Djuve and Kavli 2015). However, 
efforts to enhance activation in the Norwegian frontline service have not succeeded 
in getting sick and disabled people off the benefit system. Frontline work practice is 
the so-called black box of policy implementation, and, in order to ascertain its central 
mechanisms, it is necessary to employ an in-depth study on a micro level. Consequently, 
the aim of this article is to explore how the practice of frontline workers may shed light 
on the lack of results. What are their responses to the working conditions that seek to 
activate them?
The structure of the article is as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical 
concept of street-level bureaucrats and street-level organizations. As the behavior of 
frontline workers is shaped by policy and the organizational environment in which it 
unfolds, a governance approach to street-level bureaucracy is included in the theoretical 
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perspective, which is important for understanding frontline activation work. Then, the 
Norwegian context is presented, followed by methods used for the study. Finally, the 
findings are presented, discussed, and concluded upon.
street-level bureaucracy
Frontline workers in welfare agencies can be considered as street-level bureaucrats (Lip-
sky 2010). Their need for discretion when working with individual cases has a signifi-
cant influence on public service delivery. This was a core argument in Michael Lipsky’s 
(2010) influential work on ‘street-level bureaucracy.’ Frontline workers are often con-
fronted by ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel and Webber 1973), that is, individual problems that 
are difficult to define, hard to trace the causes of, and complicated to treat, with no easy-
fix solutions. In particular, this is often the case with claimants with health impairments. 
Thus, not only must the street-level bureaucrats achieve policy objectives, they need 
also to remain responsive to individual needs featuring a high degree of uncertainty. In 
addition, their working environment is characterized by an unremitting resource strain.
In the era of activation policies and new governing regimes, an organizational 
approach to street-level bureaucracy has emerged, which emphasizes the role of the 
street-level organization (Brodkin and Marston 2013). For instance, the establishment 
of one-stop shops and specialized units—that redefine who does what—is an example 
of governance reform (Larsen 2013). Internationally, the coordination of welfare and 
employment agencies has become more important in the era of activation policies for 
ensuring that all relevant agencies administer benefits and services in a way that enhances 
activation (van Berkel and Borghi 2008; Øverbye et al. 2010). Such coordination strat-
egies are a way of governing the street-level organizations in which the street-level 
bureaucrats work (Brodkin 2013). One-stop shops have been introduced by authori-
ties across all Nordic welfare states during recent years, as well as in other European 
states, for improving efficiency and activation (Minas 2014). They represent a top-down 
coordination strategy (Øverbye et al. 2010), and a ‘single point for delivery in order to 
increase the employment chances of the unemployed’ (Minas 2014, p. 41). Thus, this 
reorganizing is a way of activating the frontline organization. Activation policies, and 
more specifically the question of who deserves to be excused from work and activation 
and who does not, are a contested, political subject. Hence, street-level organizations are 
mediators of not only policies, but also political dilemmas. Structural changes that seek 
to enhance activation work thus alter the conditions for street-level work by placing the 
dilemmas on the street-level bureaucrats (Brodkin and Larsen 2013).
As argued by Lipsky, when faced with dilemmas, street-level bureaucrats tend 
to develop their own strategies for coping, including simplifying claimant cases and 
the environment (Lipsky 2010). Coping strategies occur in order to ‘reduce the strain 
between capabilities and goals, thereby making their jobs psychologically easier to man-
age’ (Lipsky 2010, p. 141). The goals and objectives of public institutions are usually 
contradictory. In order to rationalize ambiguities, street-level bureaucrats develop their 
own conceptions of the public service (Lipsky 2010, p. 144). Thus, as Lipsky argues, 
the practice of street-level bureaucrats is largely shaped by their working conditions. 
Two opposite coping strategies concern the use of discretion. First, street-level bureau-
crats may impose limitations to their discretionary powers in order to reduce the gap 
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between expectations and perceived capabilities. By following rules strictly and neglect-
ing their discretionary space, which may allow for alternative solutions, they protect 
themselves ‘from confronting their own shortcomings as participants in public service 
work’ (Lipsky 2010, p. 149). The second, opposite coping strategy is the ‘defense against 
bureaucracy’ (Lipsky 2010, p. 150). According to this strategy, street-level bureaucrats 
resist efforts to limit their discretion. They ‘redefine their jobs by taking into account the 
informal but likely consequences of their actions’ (ibid.).
This article aims to show the street-level bureaucrats’ responses when faced with 
structural changes in the street-level organization. Thus, we now turn to the activation 
policy measures in Norway.
the Norwegian context
The Norwegian welfare state is characterized by a generous and strongly rights-based 
social security scheme. The relatively large proportion of sick and disabled people out-
side of the labor market, and in receipt of benefits, has long been of concern to the 
national government. Recent reform of the NAV has included significant changes to the 
organization and to the provision of long-term sickness and disability benefits. Through 
these changes, Norway’s state and municipal welfare agencies seek to increase levels of 
work participation among this group of benefit claimants.
The NAV reform is one of the largest public sector reforms in Norway. It was 
introduced in response to what was considered a fragmented benefit system that had 
negative consequences for multiservice claimants with complex problems (Christensen 
et al. 2014). These claimants were typically struggling with their health or with social 
deprivation, and had been excluded from the labor market for a long time. The political 
response to the issue was to create a decentralized and coordinated labor and welfare 
agency. The two national social security agencies were merged into one and localized 
together with the municipal social assistance service into NAV offices, with one-stop 
shops situated in every municipality across the country (Askim et al. 2011). Compared 
with one-stop shops in other European countries, the NAV office is thus characterized 
by a holistic approach, both in breadth and in depth (Minas 2014). This means that the 
responsibility reaches all the way from intake to exit. The office model serves a broad 
range of target groups, not just the unemployed. The organizational structure is charac-
terized as decentralized with local autonomy (ibid.).
The local NAV offices constitute the frontline offices, or the physical contact point 
for the public. Frontline workers in these offices provide activation services—that is, 
follow-up support for claimants who need employment services and who are required 
to participate in activation schemes in order to be eligible to receive benefits. A com-
mon entrance was thought to better accommodate the diverse needs of long-term 
sick and disabled beneficiaries. In addition to the organizational restructuring, new 
activation instruments as well as changes to benefit schemes were introduced in order 
to establish common targeting of all sick and disabled people. As such, the WCA is 
a central component. The assessment is a structured, computer-assisted method for 
assessing all working-age sick and disabled people and deciding whether, and to what 
extent, a person has impaired working capability—in other words, a joint assessment 
method of their employability. The assessment can be regarded as an instrumental 
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policy mechanism developed not just for the applicants and beneficiaries, but also for 
ensuring that frontline workers emphasize work and activation in their evaluation of 
the employability of long-term sick and disabled claimants (Heum 2010; Kildal and 
Nilssen 2011).
While the frontline offices concentrate on activation, regional administrative units—
the so-called ‘back offices’—administer the benefit system. These back offices have no 
face-to-face contact with claimants, and their main task is to process benefit applica-
tions and payments. The establishment of one-stop shop frontline offices, as well as 
back offices, was intended to ensure equal treatment in benefit decisions, on the one 
hand, and to enable the frontline offices to concentrate on activation services on the 
other (Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion 2009). Thus, frontline workers have a 
relatively wide discretionary space concerning the activation process, while case officers 
in the back office are more concerned with handling benefit applications in accordance 
with specified rules and regulations.
Because of the establishment of centralized back offices, it has been highlighted that 
certain limitations to the local autonomy in the frontline offices have led to a reduction 
in the task profile and decision of the authority locally (Andreassen and Aars 2015; 
Helgøy et al. 2011). In particular, the lack of decisive authority has led to unfulfilled 
expectations by the public toward the reformed frontline agency (Helgøy et al. 2011).
the organizing of workflow in NaV
The decision reached in a WCA categorizes a claimant according to their employabil-
ity status. A ‘temporary unemployable’ status assigned by the frontline office should 
lead to an activation process with a four-year-limited incapacity benefit called the 
Work Clarification Benefit (WCB) (arbeidsavklaringspenger). The WCB is a merger 
of three earlier forms of temporary incapacity benefits. Thus, the introduction of this 
benefit has meant that activity requirements are now posed to groups whom previ-
ously were only required to undergo medical rehabilitation or were not affected by 
activity requirements at all. 
As the WCB is time-limited, the purpose of the activation process is to lead to a 
clarification of claimants’ working capability and thereby an ‘exit’ from the temporary 
benefit. Thus, after a period of activation, frontline workers undertake a reassessment 
of their claimants in order to transfer them to an exit option. A frontline worker may 
decide that the working capability of a claimant has improved and that they are now 
considered employable. In this case, the person is exited to the labor market—an exter-
nal boundary. Or, a frontline worker may consider a claimant’s working capability to be 
permanently impaired, and so transfer the claimant’s case to the back office—an intra-
organizational boundary—where a decision can be made regarding disability pension 
entitlement. Lastly, if claimants who are exited from temporary benefits do not enter 
employment or have their disability pension application refused by the back office, they 
may be secured by the temporary and subsidiary safety net of social assistance benefit, 
which is decided by the frontline office. If a claimant receives social assistance because 
no clarification was reached during WCB receipt, they may apply for the WCB again if 
they still have a medical diagnosis and a health impairment. This whole progression is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
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Data and methods
This paper reports on findings from fieldwork that took place in two local NAV offices 
from September 2012 to February 2013. One of the NAV offices is a large-sized office, 
and the other is medium sized; it is reasonable to assume that choosing different sizes 
will bring more variety to the study than, for instance, recruiting two large, city offices 
that face similar, urban challenges. In addition, previous research has shown that 
NAV offices are organized and function differently depending on the size of the office 
(Fossestøl et al. 2014). The offices are managed via central county administration, 
and the counties differ with respect to factors such as industry structure, unemploy-
ment rates, and disability benefit rates. Based on their regional situation, each county’s 
administrative unit sets priorities and controls its offices through performance man-
agement. The selection of offices for use in this study was based on the criterion of 
their location in different counties to accommodate various contextual factors that 
may affect frontline work.
The Norwegian bureaucracy is characterized by professionalized staff (Svensson 
and Evetts 2010). A majority of the staff who participated in this study had a higher 
educational background.
Figure 1: The organizing of workflow in NAV (DM=decision maker)
Source: Own depiction based on the ‘follow-up model’ (oppfølgingsmodellen) in NAV. 
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 6  ❚  Number S1  ❚  February 2016 135
I spent about 2 to 4 days a week at the NAV offices, for two and a half months and 
three and a half months (partly overlapping), respectively. I conducted interviews and 
observational studies and collected documents. The frontline workers who participated 
in the study were responsible for beneficiaries with impaired working capability; 25 
frontline workers were interviewed for about 60 to 90 minutes each. I used a semi-
structured interview framework that opened up the respondents’ own perspectives and, 
at the same time, secured answers to questions regarding the use of and thoughts about 
the WCA. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The observational data com-
prise notes, made directly on a computer, from 23 conversations between claimants and 
frontline workers. For these conversations, the claimants gave their informed consent 
(both orally and in written form) for me to obtain an anonymized copy of their WCA 
and of their action plan, which documented their agreement with a frontline worker 
regarding activation measures within a specific period. WCB recipients may be individu-
als who have expended their sickness benefit rights, which cover the first 52 weeks of 
sickness absence, or they may be sick or disabled students, or unemployed individuals 
with no such rights.
Further, I observed weekly staff meetings as well as three regional meetings arranged 
by the county offices that gathered frontline workers from all the local offices in the 
county. In addition, I often had the chance to chat informally with staff between meet-
ings and during lunch breaks. Whereas the interview data provided insights into the 
frontline workers’ perceptions of their daily work, the observational data offered a 
record of their practice in their natural environment. Undoubtedly, the claimants and the 
frontline workers would have been mindful of the study’s observation stages. However, 
they were given both oral and written assurances that my presence had no judgmental or 
evaluative purposes. In addition, all participants were given the free choice of whether or 
not to participate. Nonetheless, the frontline workers had to go on with their meetings, 
discussions, and decisions as I collected observational data—and, most of the time, my 
presence felt insignificant to them.
After the fieldwork was completed, the ensuing interview transcripts, observational 
notes, and documents were imported to a qualitative data analysis computer software 
package, NVivo 10. In the subsequent data analysis, I pursued the practice of writing 
WCAs as well as documenting the dilemmas that came to surface when this issue was 
raised. The data were coded on the basis of a close reading. The first step resulted in 
a wide range of detailed coding. In the second step, I merged the codes thematically in 
order to make patterns visible. The codes were structured around main observations 
during the fieldwork: when and for what reasons a WCA was written, as well as in 
what circumstances a WCA was not completed because of difficulties in the clarification 
process. 
Findings
Figure 1 illustrates the formal, envisioned workflow in NAV. In this section, fieldwork 
data are presented using this figure as a context through which to understand frontline 
work in practice—that is, exploring frontline workers’ responses and strategies when 
faced with the task of getting long-term sick and disabled claimants out of the tempo-
rary benefit scheme.
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Writing Wcas: rubber-stamping decisions
A central finding is that WCAs usually represent the formalization of a decision that has 
already been made in the activation process.
In cases that are directed at the disability pension exit, this practice was encour-
aged by instructions from the county management. The following quote is taken from 
a meeting between a large group of frontline workers from different NAV offices and a 
representative from the county office. 
County office representative: The frontline office shouldn’t conclude upon perma-
nently impaired working capability just because a claimant has applied for a disability 
pension. Such a conclusion should only be reached when the frontline worker considers 
the claimant clarified. (Observational notes)
Clarification for disability pension means that frontline workers need to consider the 
specified attributes a claimant must have for qualifying for disability pension when writ-
ing a WCA concluding that a claimant is permanently unemployable. Eligibility criteria 
include evidence that extensive medical rehabilitation and work training/activation have 
been undertaken that prove that the individual’s working capability cannot be improved. 
The county office representative’s instruction implies that the frontline workers should 
be responsible for the claimant’s exit from the temporary benefit. They are expected to 
control the inflow of disability pension applicants by deciding at what point the claim-
ants have been sufficiently activated and clarified. It is the frontline worker who should 
decide, based on criteria decided by the back office, when a claimant could be considered 
permanently unemployable—the claimant should not apply for the disability pension on 
her/his own (although they have a legal right to do so). In other words, disability pension 
is an exit option that should only result from an activation process and a clarification of 
a claimant’s employability in accordance with the eligibility criteria, which are decided 
by the back office. This reduces the frontline workers’ autonomy, which is enforced by 
the organizational division as well as the division between the WCA and benefit criteria. 
Therefore, I noted a specific practice to occur among frontline workers:
Frontline worker: (…) [T]hose who apply for the disability pension apply in agreement 
with me. (Interview transcript)
If a claimant applies without an agreement with a frontline worker, that person risks 
having their application denied because their working capability has not yet been clari-
fied by the frontline office and the person no longer complies with the criteria for the 
temporary benefit. Therefore, the frontline workers encourage people to stay in the 
activation process until they have proven either employability or permanent unemploy-
ability. When writing a WCA during the exit phase, the frontline worker prepares for 
a subsequent benefit decision according to specified entitlement rules. Thus, while the 
WCA is intended to empower the frontline workers, it could rather be considered a 
formality and rubber-stamping of decisions that have been taken in accordance with 
prescribed rules. Frontline workers write WCAs primarily in those cases when they are 
convinced that their claimant complies with the disability pension criteria.
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When writing WCAs for the other main exit option—work—the cases were regarded 
as rather uncomplicated. The claimant had either gotten a job offer, or was to return to 
existing employment, or the case was seen as clearly clarified. One frontline worker said: 
Frontline worker: (…) It is either work or disability pension. For instance, an activa-
tion plan may state that a claimant is suffering from back pain, that the person is granted 
vocational re-education that will make her employable for other work, and that when the 
education is completed, the person is clarified. Then, the claimant will have these three 
final months for job seeking. In this case, there is a written agreement in advance. Then 
you’re out. (Interview transcript)
The frontline worker refers to those cases when there is a clear agreement in advance that 
makes the case clear. This experience is typical among the frontline workers; the clarifica-
tion process is experienced as easier when claimants’ problems are relatively uncompli-
cated than when a person has complex health problems and insecure job prospects.
avoiding the Wca
Thus, in order to understand how the frontline workers consider cases that do not reach 
an exit for work or disability pension provision, it is important to look at the practice 
that occurs before they make formal decisions in WCAs.
A recurrent issue that occupied frontline workers in this study was the difficulties they 
experienced in reaching definitive clarifications of their claimants’ working capability:
Frontline worker: (…) I try to push them a little. But, I’m thinking, if they have been in 
the system for a long time, and many have—often going back to before 2010 [before the 
WCB was introduced]—and, then, we should make magic happen within a short period of 
time? It doesn’t work like that. (…). (Interview transcript)
Making ‘magic happen’ refers to getting claimants into employment. WCB recipients 
have usually been out of the labor market for a relatively long time, and, thus, lack 
work experience and have health problems. Frontline workers sometimes find it hard to 
consider the medical reports from claimants’ doctors as well as further possibilities for 
treatment that could improve their health. Should the claimant be activated further or 
exited to the job market? Such dilemmas are difficult to deal with, as expressed by the 
frontline worker in the quote above.
The frontline workers in my study often seemed determined to avoid writing a 
WCA if a case was not completely clarified for one of the two main exit options. In 
particular, they were clear about wanting to avoid a situation in which the back office 
would disagree with their assessment that a claimant is permanently disabled. As a 
result, frontline workers often avoid writing a WCA that alters the claimant’s status as 
temporarily unemployable in the benefit system if they think that the application for dis-
ability pension will be refused, even though they consider their claimant unemployable. 
In this sense, the structural boundary between the front line and the back office is, in 
some cases, perceived as a barrier during the activation/clarification process because the 
frontline workers are restricted in deeming their claimants permanently unemployable.
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Frontline workers may consider that their claimant has tried all possible activity 
measures but is still not near work readiness, nor eligible for the disability pension. 
Consequently, as the frontline worker in the following quote says, their work is about 
continually assessing claimants’ employability, thus highlighting the work capability 
assessments that happen outside of the formal ones:
Frontline worker: (…) I cannot really say that it only happens [writing WCAs] at the 
entrance and the exit—that is, when we do it technically speaking. Through the activity 
plans and follow-up notes that happen when working with the claimant, in dialogue with 
a claimant, and in collaborative meetings, and so on … it is an on-going work capability 
assessment—it is what we do. (Interview transcript)
There are certain reasons why the frontline workers avoid writing WCAs. If a claimant 
is exited from the WCB, but not eligible for the disability pension, and lacks job oppor-
tunities, the person may go on to be supported by the social assistance allowance, which 
is only intended as a subsidiary and temporary provision. The frontline office, as a one-
stop shop, is partnered with the social assistance administration. The colocation created 
some special concerns among the frontline workers: 
Frontline worker: (…) Looking at the big picture, if we prolong the case by providing 
the claimant a work training place, we can spare colleagues from a situation where the 
claimant ends up on social assistance. (Observational notes)
Frontline worker: (…) [I]t’s like a circle, right? I close a case, the claimant applies 
for social assistance (…), preparing a new application for WCB [the Work Clarification 
Benefit], it generates a lot of work. So, it would be great to avoid such situations. (…). 
(Interview transcript)
As the two frontline workers express, the application process that follows an exit to 
social assistance is considered undesirable, as it will put a strain on staff resources at 
the frontline office by creating a circular process. Thus, the frontline workers take into 
account considerations that concern the resource utilization within the one-stop shop. 
Another reason for avoiding writing WCAs, and altering the claimants’ employability 
status in cases that were not completely clarified, was the concern for the financial situ-
ation of the claimants if they were exited from the temporary benefit and left to social 
assistance. Instead of exiting these claimants, the frontline workers often choose to con-
tinue activating them so that they comply with the activation criteria of the temporary 
benefit. One frontline worker expressed it like this:
Frontline worker: (…). We’re too kind. We don’t close the cases when we should. 
(Observational notes)
Sometimes, frontline workers openly confessed that some claimants could be considered 
employable if they had been more strict in their judgments. However, the issue of where 
to draw the line between employable and unemployable is difficult to determine when a 
claimant has no job offers and still struggles with a health impairment:
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Frontline worker: We rarely carry out a WCA in those cases [when the claimant has 
not succeeded in obtaining work]. The claimants will be left without income. They only 
get three months. Should we shuffle them over to social assistance? No, I don’t think so. 
We would rather let them float. At least, I do. I believe the others do, too. The claimants 
that have completed education are usually finished in June. If we were to close their case 
at that time, they would not manage to get a job during the summer. Even in those cases, 
we will not close the cases until the claimants have obtained work. We might schedule a 
meeting in August to talk about how they should find work. We might offer a job-seeking 
course. As long as they are participating in an activity scheme, at least, we cannot close 
their case. (Observational notes)
This frontline worker’s considerations regarding exiting those who undergo education 
differ from those of the frontline worker quoted earlier, who pointed out the impor-
tance of making agreements in advance. However, as expressed by this frontline worker 
(above), a claimant may be healthy enough to enter the labor market, but, at the same 
time, lack work experience, which makes their job prospects poor. This may lead to 
concerns about claimants’ financial situations. Another worker expressed it like this:
Frontline worker: I’m concerned about the claimants’ financial state. Will they manage 
financially if they haven’t gotten any work? They will end up on social assistance. (Obser-
vational notes)
Working backwards
In some cases, if the frontline workers think that the case officers in the back office are 
too strict in their judgments, they can find themselves advocating their claimant’s case 
vis-à-vis the back office. In such cases, claimants have typically received the WCB for a 
substantial amount of time, and have tried out several activation schemes and medical 
treatment without seeing improvements to their working capability. Their health situa-
tion may be complex and their working capability complicated by other barriers, such as 
low formal skills, poor language skills, and long absences from the labor market. If the 
frontline workers think that all activation measures have been exhausted, they may then 
concentrate on gathering conclusive evidence and writing a convincing WCA. Hence, 
this study’s findings suggest that these frontline workers sometimes ‘work backward’: 
instead of continuing activating and collecting evidence that may eventually result in 
eligibility for disability pension, they formulate an opinion that their claimant should be 
eligible for disability pension and then activate and collect evidence toward this specific 
purpose. This strategy is also previously found to occur in physicians’ (General Practitio-
ners) disability assessments vis-à-vis the benefit agency (Getz et al. 1994).
A frontline worker in my study explained that the WCA can be important because 
you have met the claimant and are able to provide an overall picture of the situation. 
In one case, a claimant had been to one of NAV’s cooperative medical specialists who 
considered the claimant to be severely ill and suffering from a range of complex tor-
ments resulting in his being nonemployable. The specialist added a sentence that said 
the patient would benefit from a change of lifestyle. Because of this sentence, the back 
office turned down the disability pension application. However, the frontline worker 
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considered it impossible to get the claimant to change his lifestyle. After some time, the 
claimant submitted a new application for disability pension. There were no changes to 
his situation. The frontline worker stressed that there were no recovery prospects, and 
referred to a new medical report from the treating doctor stating that the claimant was 
medically clarified and that his health had aggravated in recent years. This time, disabil-
ity pension was granted. The frontline worker mentions a similar case where the claim-
ant was suffering from severe mental illness as well as some physical health problems. 
The medical evidence stated that the claimant was going to undergo a hip replacement. 
This resulted in a refusal by the back office because an operation was considered a 
possibility for improvement in the working capability. However, the frontline worker 
knew that the hip replacement would not affect the claimant’s working capability. Thus, 
in the new WCA, the frontline worker made sure that the treating doctor as well as a 
medical specialist provided evidence stating that mental illness was the main cause for 
the impairment of working capability. This time, the disability pension application was 
granted.
The practice of working backward as illustrated by this frontline worker implies 
that the workers’ discretionary space vis-à-vis the back office is not completely reduced. 
In some gray zone cases, they may tip the case in the desired direction.
Discussion
As the findings in this article suggest, the frontline workers are restrictive about when to 
write WCAs and thereby getting people off temporary benefit receipt, even when their 
own considerations point toward an exit.
If the frontline workers regard a person to be permanently unemployable, they 
find themselves in an organizational dependency vis-à-vis the back office. The front-
line workers need to secure a smooth transaction of the case processing at the back 
office.
In a study by Caswell and Høybye-Mortensen (2015), the high level of economic 
sanctions on claimants’ nonattendance to activation projects in two Danish frontline 
offices was linked to the organizational division between those workers who were 
responsible for WCAs and those responsible for imposing sanctions. The latter had 
no face-to-face contact with the claimants. The distance from claimants was sought to 
secure a more consistent implementation of sanctioning, without taking into account 
various, invalid excuses from claimants. Hence, not knowing the claimant was thought 
to make decisions on sanctions more firm than if workers who knew their claimants’ 
life stories were to impose the sanctions themselves. A similar mechanism can be seen 
in this study. As the findings indicate, the separation between assessments of working 
capability and the disability pension provision imposes limitations to the frontline work-
ers’ discretion when deeming claimants permanently unemployable. The organizational 
division makes it necessary for the frontline workers to envision how the back office will 
consider their claimants’ cases. Consequently, the frontline workers are encouraged to 
restrict the inflow of disability pension applicants and thereby continue activating their 
claimants. In this sense, they adapted to the activation policies, a finding which is in line 
with research on frontline workers in other countries (Marston 2013; van der Aa and 
van Berkel 2015).
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When the frontline workers act as their claimants’ advocate, the organizational struc-
ture seems to have an opposite effect: advocating a claimant’s case may be viewed as a 
coping strategy that stems from the close contact and the one-stop shop’s overall respon-
sibility for claimants with health impairments. If the frontline workers experience a gap 
between the back office’s opinion and their own, they impose a ‘defense against bureau-
cracy’ by redefining their task of limiting the inflow of disability pension applicants (Lip-
sky 2010). In this way, the back office becomes the frontline office’s counterparty.
The organizational separation results in significant dilemmas for frontline workers 
concerning how to exit claimants when dealing with complex cases. In addition, they 
lack control over the will of potential employers to employ their claimants. Hence, the 
frontline workers struggle to succeed with the goal of their work, which is to get people 
off temporary benefit-receipt. So, the frontline workers lack influence over the two main 
exit options. As a result, their coping strategies for filling the gap between goals and real-
ity can be regarded as both a defense against bureaucracy and at the same time imposing 
limitations to their discretionary powers.
First, considering the employment exit, the activation policy goal is to get more 
people off benefits and into work. Although the frontline workers consider a claimant 
to be more or less employable, they tend to await actual job offers as proof of employ-
ability. This can be regarded as a ‘defense against bureaucracy’ by resisting limitations to 
their discretionary ability. They are not comfortable with the ‘work first’ idea of activa-
tion policies and so they redefine their job, from that of an activation worker to that of 
an income right securer. Although the frontline offices are supposed not to worry too 
much about income security, but rather activation, the two components are intertwined. 
In other words, claimants receive activation services from the frontline office because 
they are dependent on income security. Thus, the frontline workers take into account the 
informal consequences of their decisions. This coping strategy can be linked to the gen-
erous and rights-based benefit scheme in Norway. The welfare state has a strong role as 
income securer in cases of sickness and disability. The frontline workers’ coping strategy 
may be interpreted as a refusal to diverge from this role. Their discretionary powers in 
the activation process allow for such a refusal. 
Second, the frontline workers’ resistance to exiting cases can also be understood as 
an opposite coping strategy. Their lack of influence on the two main exit options results 
in a continuous activation and thereby a lock-in on the temporary benefit although their 
discretionary powers allow them to exit more claimants to the labor market. In this sense, 
they impose limitations to their discretionary powers and protect themselves ‘from con-
fronting their own shortcomings as participants in public service work’ (Lipsky 2010, p. 
149). They avoid exiting claimants that potentially could have been exited. Instead, they 
act as gatekeepers, not only to the disability pension but also to the labor market.
The frontline workers do not only endeavor to secure their claimants’ income 
security but also the resource situation at the frontline office by preventing ‘a circle’ 
in the office, if no exit options are perceived to be available. They consider it better 
to keep claimants on temporary benefits even though the person may be considered 
to be employable, or permanently unemployable if no exit options seem to exist in 
practice. Similar to findings in other studies of frontline workers’ implementation of 
activation policy schemes (Møller and Stone 2013; van der Aa and van Berkel 2015), 
the Norwegian workers also make their own interpretations of activation policy 
norms. However, what seems to differ in the Norwegian context is that the frontline 
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workers’ interpretations are likely to conflict with formal policy and governance 
intentions.
Lastly, one may have expected the frontline workers to exit those claimants who 
were difficult to clarify. By writing a WCA that altered their employability status, 
the frontline workers would thereby get rid of difficult cases. However, this was not 
found to occur in my study. The frontline workers argued that they did not want to 
strain their colleagues and create circles in the system. Due to the nature of qualita-
tive methods, the findings in this study cannot be generalized to all NAV offices in 
Norway. However, some of the frontline workers’ concerns apply to the one-stop 
shop organization and the benefit structure, which is a nationally common feature. 
Thus, it may be inferred that the structural conditions that seem to promote the 
practices that appeared in this study may also promote similar practices in offices 
other than those included in this study. In addition, the patterns that occurred do not 
feature any large diversification—rather, the practice of frontline workers appears to 
be quite similar. This may be explained by structural similarities that promote certain 
practices.
conclusion
The organizational boundaries that structure the conditions for frontline work may 
be considered as more than just new ways of organizing the delivery of welfare poli-
cies, but also as a central part of the activation policy project (Brodkin and Marston 
2013). The current one-stop shop organization is intended to unite overall responsi-
bilities for the activation of claimants, thereby getting more beneficiaries into employ-
ment. However, as the findings in this article suggest, the limited range of exit options 
restricts the discretion of the frontline workers, which results in locking claimants 
with complex problems into temporary benefit. The frontline workers’ assessments 
hinge on criteria set by actors outside the frontline office that are often hard to obtain 
for their claimants. Therefore, the frontline workers’ attention tends to be drawn to 
concerns that are likely to be unintended, which are to keep claimants’ income safe, 
to secure a smooth workflow, and to smooth benefit transactions. The context of a 
generous welfare state with a strongly rights-based benefit scheme is regarded as a 
likely contributor to these concerns. 
Consequently, the establishment of a holistic one-stop shop agency, which gives the 
frontline offices a substantial responsibility for finding individual solutions, combined 
with exit options that are hard to obtain, seems to represent a ‘mission impossible’ for 
the Norwegian frontline workers. This implies that it is necessary to rethink the orga-
nization of activation services and benefit administration as well as more realistic exit 
options for long-term sick and disabled people.
acknowledgments
I would like to thank the following people for valuable comments to earlier drafts of this 
article: Two anonymous referees, Anniken Hagelund, Lars Inge Terum, Einar Øverbye, 
my colleagues in the research group Governance and Professions, Simone Leiber and the 
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 6  ❚  Number S1  ❚  February 2016 143
other participants at the 2015 ESPAnet Doctoral Workshop at the University of Düssel-
dorf, and the participants at session B2 ‘Active labour market policy’ at the 2015 Street 
Level Bureaucracy Conference in Copenhagen.
references
Andreassen, T. A., & Aars, J. (2015). Den store reformen: da NAV ble til. [The major reform: 
when NAV was born.] Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Askim, J., Fimreite, A. L., Moseley, A., & Pedersen, L. H. (2011). One-stop shops for social 
welfare: The adaptation of an organizational form in three countries. Public Administra-
tion 89(4): 1451–1468. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01933.x.
Baumberg, B., Warren, J., Garthwaite, K., & Bambra, C. (2015) Rethinking the Work Capa-
bility Assessment, London: Demos.
Bredgaard, T., & Larsen, F. (2008). Re-designing the Governance of Employment Policies—
Decentralised Centralisation in Municipal Job-Centres. Conference paper, CARMA’s 
25th anniversary conference, October 10, 2008, Aalborg University, Denmark.
Brodkin, E. Z. (2013). Street-Level Organizations and the Welfare State. In E. Z. Brodkin & 
G. Marston (Eds.), Work and the Welfare State: Street-Level Organizations and Workfare 
Politics (pp. 17–34). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Brodkin, E. Z., & Larsen, F. (2013). The Policies of Workfare. At the Boundaries between 
Work and the Welfare State. In E. Z. Brodkin & G. Marston (Eds.), Work and the Welfare 
State. Street-Level Organizations and Workfare Policies (pp. 57–67). Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press.
Brodkin, E. Z., & Marston, G. (2013). Work and the Welfare State: Street-Level Organiza-
tions and Workfare Politics, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Caswell, D., & Høybye-Mortensen, M. (2015). Responses from the frontline: How organi-
sations and street-level bureaucrats deal with economic sanctions. European Journal of 
Social Security 17(1): 31. 
Caswell, D., Marston, G., & Larsen, J. E. (2010). Unemployed citizen or ‘at risk’client? Clas-
sification systems and employment services in Denmark and Australia. Critical Social 
Policy 30(3): 384–404. 
Christensen, T., Fimreite, A., & Lægreid, P. (2014). Joined-up government for welfare ad-
ministration reform in Norway. Public Organization Review 14(4): 439–456. doi: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11115-013-0237-8.
Djuve, A. B., & Kavli, H. C. (2015). Facilitating user involvement in activation programmes: 
When carers and clerks meet pawns and queens. Journal of Social Policy 44(02): 235–
254. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0047279414000804.
Fevang, E., Markussen, S., & Røed, K. (2014). NAV-reformen: Støvet legger seg etter en tur-
bulent omstilling [NAV Reform: The dust settles after a turbulent restructuring.] Søkelys 
på arbeidslivet [Spotlight on Employment] (1–2): 83–99.
Fossestøl, K., Breit, E., & Borg, E. (2014). NAV-reformen 2014. En oppfølgingsstudie av 
lokalkontorenes organisering etter innholdsreformen [The NAV reform 2014. A follow 
up study of the organization of local offices after the content reform.] Report 13/2014. 
Oslo: The Work Research Institute.
Garsten, C., & Jacobsson, K. (2013). Sorting people in and out: The plasticity of the cat-
egories of employability, work capacity and disability as technologies of government. 
Ephemera 13(4): 825–850. 
Getz, L., Westin, S., & Paulsen, B. (1994). Behandler og sakkyndig—mellom barken og 
veden? Allmennpraktikerens arbeid med uførepensjonssaker i en innstrammingstid. 
144 Getting Sick and Disabled People off Temporary Benefit Receipt H. Moen Gjersøe
[Therapist or autority expert? General physicians work with disability pension cases in a 
time of retrenchement] Tidsskrift for Den norske lægeforening [Journal of the Norwegian 
Medical Doctor Society] 114(12): 1435–1441.
Gjersøe, H. M. (2016). Regulating inflow or outflow: A comparison of the work capa-
bility assessments in the UK and Norway. Journal of Social Policy 45(01): 141–158. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0047279415000471.
Helgøy, I., Kildal, N., & Nilssen, E. (2011). Ny yrkesrolle i en organisasjon i endring. [New 
vocational position in a changing organization] Nordiske Organisasjonsstudier [Nordic 
Organizational Studies] 13(3): 34–54. 
Heum, I. (2010). Brukerrettet arbeidsmetodikk i NAV [User-Oriented Working Methods in 
NAV.] In T. Hernes, I. Heum, & P. Haavorsen (Eds.), Arbeidsinkludering: Om det nye 
politikk- og praksisfeltet i velferds-Norge [Work Inclusion: The New Policy and Field of 
Practice in Norway]: 194–227. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.
Kalstø, Å. M., & Sørbø, J. (2014). Personer med nedsatt arbeidsevne og mottakere av ar-
beidsavklaringspenger [People with Reduced Capacity for Work and Recipients of Work 
Clarification Benefit.] December 2014. Statistikknotat [Statistics Notes]. Oslo: Arbeids- 
og velferdsdirektoratet.
Kildal, N., & Nilssen, E. (2011). Norwegian Welfare Reforms: Social Contracts and Activa-
tion Policies. In S. Betzelt & S. Bothfeld (Eds.), Activation and Labour Market Reforms in 
Europe: Challenges to Social Citizenship (pp. 218–239). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Larsen, F. (2013). Active Labor-Market Reform in Denmark. The Role of Governance in Poli-
cy Change. In E. Z. Brodkin & G. Marston (Eds.), Work and the Welfare State. Street-lev-
el Organizations and Workfare Policies (pp. 103–123). Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press.
Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, 
30th anniversary expanded ed. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Marston, G. (2013). Front-line Workers as Intermediaries: The Changing Landscape of Disa-
bility and Employment Services in Australia. In E. Z. Brodkin & G. Marston (Eds.), Work 
and the Welfare State: Street-Level Organizations and Workfare Politics (pp. 209–225). 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Minas, R. (2014). One‐stop shops: Increasing employability and overcoming welfare state 
fragmentation? International Journal of Social Welfare 23(S1): S40–S53. doi: http://dx.
doi.org/10.1111/ijsw.12090.
Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion. (2006). Arbeid, velferd og inkludering [Work, Wel-
fare and Inclusion], St.meld. nr. 9 [Report to the Storting, White Paper No.9] (2006-
2007). Oslo: Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion.
Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion. (2009). Redegjørelse om situasjonen i arbeids- og 
velferdsforvaltningen og forslag om tilførsel av ressurser til Arbeids- og velferdsetaten 
[Report on the situation in the Labour and Welfare Administration and Proposal on 
Resource Supply to the Labour and Welfare Service], St.prop. nr. 51 [Proposition to the 
Storting no. 51] (2008–2009). Oslo: Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion.
Møller, M. Ø., & Stone, D. (2013). Disciplining disability under Danish active labour market 
policy. Social Policy & Administration 47(5): 586–604. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
j.1467-9515.2012.00835.x.
NAV. (2015). Hovedtall om arbeidsmarkedet. Mars 2015. (Key figures on the labour market. 
March 2015.) Retrieved April 7, 2015 from https://www.nav.no/no/NAV+og+samfunn/
Statistikk/Arbeidssokere+og+stillinger+-+statistikk/Hovedtall+om+arbeidsmarkedet/_at-
tachment/411421?_download=true&_ts=14c5681b3b8.
Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy 
Sciences 4(2): 155–169. 
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 6  ❚  Number S1  ❚  February 2016 145
Soss, J., Fording, R., & Schram, S. F. (2011). The organization of discipline: From performance 
management to perversity and punishment. Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory 21(suppl 2): i203–i232. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq095.
Statistics Norway. (2014). Indikatorer for bærekraftig utvikling. Mottakere av uførepens-
jon og arbeidsavklaringspenger [Indicators for sustainable development. Recipients of 
disability pension and work clarification benefit.] Oslo: Statistics Norway. Retrieved 
April 7, 2015 from https://www.ssb.no/natur-og-miljo/barekraft/mottakere-av-uforep-
ensjon-og-arbeidsavklaringspenger.
Svensson, L. G., & Evetts, J. (2010). Introduction. In L. G. Svensson & J. Evetts (Eds.), Soci-
ology of Professions: Continental and Anglo-Saxon Traditions (pp. 8–29). Gothenburg: 
Daidalos.
Van Berkel, R. (2013). Triple Activation: Introducing Welfare-to-Work into Dutch Social As-
sistance. In E. Brodkin & G. Marston (Eds.), Work and the Welfare State: Street-Level 
Organizations and Workfare Politics. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Van Berkel, R., & Borghi, V. (2008). Introduction: The governance of activation. Social Policy 
and Society 7(03): 331–340. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1474746408004302.
van der Aa, P., & van Berkel, R. (2015). Fulfilling the Promise of Professionalism in Street- 
Level Practice. In P. Hupe, H. M. & A. E. Buffat (Eds.), Understanding Street-Level 
Bureaucracy (p. 263). Bristol: Policy Press.
Øverbye, E., Smith, R. S. N., Karjalainen, V., & Stremlow, J. (2010). The Coordination Chal-
lenge. In Y. Kazepov (Ed.), Rescaling Social Policies: Towards Multilevel Governance in 
Europe (pp. 389–414). Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
